This paper examines the choice of government expenditure on public goods and transfer payments, in the form of a pension, in an overlapping generations model. Government expenditure is tax-financed on a pay-asyou-go basis. A utilitarian judge chooses expenditures to maximize a social welfare function. The nonlinear solution is found to involve the ratio of a welfare-weighted average income, which depends on the inequality aversion of the judge, to arithmetic mean income. An approximation for this ratio is found which produces explicit solutions for the optimal composition. The result is used to obtain an indication of 'implicit' inequality aversion for a range of countries.
Introduction
A number of recent studies emphasise the importance of unobserved cultural factors in shaping tax and expenditure policies. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , on the basis of cross-national survey data, conjecture that different preferences for a more equal income distribution in Europe and the U.S. may play an important role in accounting for the considerable differences in their expenditure policies. Corneo and Grüner (2002) , using a large international survey, present empirical evidence of systematic differences across countries in the preference for redistributive policies. To understand the way in which different views regarding inequality may influence the composition of expenditure, this paper carries out a normative exploration of the expenditure mix which would be chosen by a utilitarian judge having a degree of inequality aversion.
The framework of analysis is that of the choice of expenditure on non-rival and non-excludable public goods and transfer payments, in the form of an unconditional pension, in a growing economy with overlapping generations. Expenditure is tax-financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. The utilitarian judge is regarded as maximising a social welfare function expressed in terms of the utilities of heterogenous individuals, subject to the pay-as-you-go financing constraint. By taking a growth context and focusing on the expenditure composition for a given tax rate, 1 the model also allows for a range of factors other than the judge's inequality aversion which may contribute to the division of expenditures, such as consumers' preference, tax rate, interest rate, and the growth rates of income and population.
The transfer payment in the model is referred as a pension, since it is received in the second period of life. However, it may be thought of more broadly as a standard type of income transfer since it involves a decision regarding income shifting between periods within the life cycle as well as intra-and inter-generational redistribution.
The optimal expenditure ratio, defined as the ratio of transfer payments (here the pension) to public goods expenditure, is shown to depend on a welfareweighted mean income in relation to arithmetic mean income, along with individuals' preferences for public goods, the discount rate, population and income growth rates, and the tax rate. However, a closed-form solution for the expenditure ratio is not available, as the welfare-weighted mean income in general depends on the choice of pension expenditure. 2 A useful approximation is therefore considered for the welfare-weighted mean income, using an explicit form for the welfare function.
This produces an explicit approximate solution for the optimal expenditure ratio, and simulations show that the approximation performs well. Comparative statics based on the approximate solution are shown to be as expected; in particular, a higher inequality aversion gives rise, ceteris paribus, to the transfer payment forming a larger proportion of total government expenditure.
It is of course unreasonable to suggest that, in practice, expenditure decisions arise from the optimising plans of a single omniscient and omnipotent judge. However, it is of interest to consider the hypothetical question of what value judgements could be considered to be implicit in the observed expenditure policies across countries. The approximate closed-form solution for the optimal expenditure ratio allows an implied value of inequality aversion to be obtained for a range of countries, given data for other determinants of the expenditure ratio for each country. The results show that different degrees of inequality aversion are evident among the countries examined. The average implied inequality aversion for Scandinavian countries is consistently higher than that of Commonwealth countries, while the U.S. has a lower degree of inequality aversion than average Scandinavian countries and Commonwealth countries. These results are consis-tent with Lambert, Millimet and Slottje (2003) , where they measure the degree of inequality aversion for a large sample of countries from income inequality indexes.
Germany has the highest implied inequality aversion among all countries. Significant inequality aversion in Germany was also found in Lambert, et al. (2003) and Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) , where the latter used regional life-satisfaction data to estimate inequality aversion in Germany. These results suggest that variations in expenditure patterns indeed reflect different social preferences regarding inequality which may result from cultural differences across countries. This study then provides a structural way to tackle the conjecture of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) .
In view of the complexity of decision making in practice and the frequent need for compromises, it is typically far from straightforward to 'reconstruct' the values which may be implied by actual policies. The evaluation of implicit values can thus help to judge the consistency of actual policies with certain stated objectives of policy makers and commentators. This study therefore relates to a large literature which attempts to recover implicit value judgements in government tax and expenditure policies. For example, early attempts to impute a value of inequality aversion implicit in government tax decisions include Christiansen and Jansen (1978) and Stern (1977) . 3 More recent studies include Madden (1992 Madden ( , 1995 and Cragg (1991) in the context of indirect taxes, and Oliver and Spadaro (2004) and Spadaro (2007) in the context of direct taxation. 4 Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) and Lambert et al. (2003) , as mentioned above, provide empirical examinations of attitudes toward inequality. By using a structural model to infer inequality aversion for a range of countries, the present study obtains results which are consistent with these earlier studies.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment. Section 3 examines the optimal choice of expenditure of the utilitarian judge. Section 4 describes the approximation which produces the closed-form solution for the expenditure ratio and discusses the compartive statics. Implicit value judgements for a range of countries are investigated in Section 5. Brief conclusions are in section 6.
The Economic Environment
This section describes the overlapping generations model in which a pure public good and a transfer payment, in the form of a pension, are tax-financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Each individual is assumed to live for two periods, a working and a retirement period, so that the economy is populated by two overlapping cohorts in any given period. Individuals have identical preferences but are heterogenous with respect to incomes. A young individual , born at time , works in the first period and receives an exogenously fixed income,   . Income is taxed at rate  , which is the same for all individuals and is assumed to be exogenously determined. In period , a young individual, , allocates disposable income between current consumption,  1 , and savings,   . In the second period of life, the individual finances consumption of private goods,  2+1 , using the unconditional and untaxed pension from the government,  +1 , and the return on savings, (1 + )  , where  is the constant interest rate at which individuals can borrow or lend. The price of the private consumption goods is normalised to unity, so that  also denotes private consumption expenditure.
The quantity of pure public good in period  is denoted as   , which can be consumed by all individuals in period . Assume that the production of public goods involves a constant unit cost, . Then government expenditure on public goods in  is simply   ≡   .
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Suppose all individuals have Cobb-Douglas preferences, expressed for person  as:
where 0   = 1(1 + )  1 is the discount factor,  is the time preference rate, and  is the utility weight attached to consumption of public goods, reflecting the individuals' preference for public goods relative to private goods.
In view of the inter-generational transfers in addition to the income shifting and intra-generational redistribution, it is desirable to allow for population and income growth. Suppose the average income of young individuals grows at a constant rate of  over time, and there is constant growth, at the rate , in the population, where   denotes the number of individuals born in period .
It is assumed that income growth involves an equal proportional change at all income levels and that population growth involves an equal proportional change in population frequencies at each income level, so that  and  are independent.
The Optimal Choice of a Utilitarian Judge
This section investigates the optimal choice of expenditure by a utilitarian judge who aims to maximise a social welfare function. It begins by describing each individual's consumption and saving choice conditional on government expenditures, which yields indirect utility as a function of expenditure terms. It then defines the social welfare function in terms of individual utilities and characterises the optimal expenditure ratio, defined as the ratio of total expenditure on pensions to that on public goods, that maximises the social welfare function.
From Section 2, the lifetime budget constraint of individual  is given by:
This form allows for the fact that tax-financed public goods are non-excludable so that individuals are not charged at the point of consumption. The consumption 6 plans, conditional on the values of public expenditure and the pension, are given, using the standard properties of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, as
So the indirect utility function,   , is:
The utilitarian judge, recognizing that individuals' consumption and saving decisions are conditional on its expenditure choices, chooses a sequence of expenditures on public goods and pensions,
, ( 0 and  0 are given), to maximise a social welfare function, subject to the government budget constraint in every period.
In the pay-as-you-go financing structure, income tax revenue in each period must be sufficient to finance the transfer payments to those currently retired along with the public good. Hence, at time  the government budget constraint is given by:
The social welfare function is defined as the following discounted sum of all generations' utilities:
where  is the government's discount factor, which could be different from private individuals' discount factor, . The social welfare associated with generation ,   , is defined as a function of utilities of all individuals born in period :
where   is defined in (3), and the function  is time-invariant, individualistic and paretean. To ensure the problem is well defined, it is also assumed that  is additively separable, and strictly increasing and (weakly) concave in each of its argument.
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A simplification arises from the fact that the imposition of pay-as-you-go financing as well as the two-period overlapping generations nature of the model ensures that maximisation of the social welfare function in (5) is equivalent to the maximisation of   in every period .
Then the first-order conditions for choice of  +1 , for  = 0 1   , are given by:
Define
as the welfare weight attached to an increase in 's income. Then:
Hence, writing  =    P   =1   , where
, and noting that from the government budget constraint in (4),  +1  +1 = −  , substitution in (7) for each  gives:
This result does not depend on the precise form of  or  , but further progress can be made using (3) above, which gives:
Substituting into (9) and writing  = P       gives:
( 1 2 ) 5 The social welfare function defined this way is consistent with requirements for timeconsistent policy. See Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) and Ambler (2000) for further discussion on this issue in overlapping generations models. A simple form of   adopted by many studies, such as Ghiglino (2000) , defines   as the weighted sum of lifetime utilities of individuals in cohort .
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The term  is a welfare-weighted average of individual incomes with weights,  .
Substituting the government budget constraint into (12) gives the optimal per capita expenditure on the pension,  +1 . Therefore the ratio of total expenditure on pension to total expenditure,  +1 ≡    +1   +1+1 , is given by:
The share of total expenditure on public goods,  +1   +1+1 , is thus simply obtained as 1 −  +1 . Therefore the ratio of total expenditure on pensions to that on public goods,  +1 , is:
This result shows how the optimal expenditure ratio,  +1 , depends, inter alia, on the ratio of the welfare-weighted mean income to the arithmetic mean income at time  as well as parameters regarding population growth, income growth, the tax rate and preferences. 6 This optimal choice is characterised by a balanced growth path, along which all aggregate endogenous variables grow at the same rate as aggregate income, and per capita variables grow at the same rate as average income.
The expression in (14) cannot of course be regarded as providing a closed-form solution for the expenditure ratio, as the welfare-weighted mean income in general depends on the value of . However, a useful approximation is considered in the following subsection, using an explicit form for the welfare function.
Approximating the Optimal Expenditure Ratio
This section shows how an approximation for the optimal expenditure ratio can be obtained by approximating the welfare-weighted average income,  , using a widely adopted social welfare function which takes the iso-elastic form:
( 1 5 ) where   0 denotes the relative inequality aversion of the judge. 7 From (15),
 , for all   0, and obtaining    +1 from (3), the welfare weights,   = (    )  (   +1 ), are:
This form is clearly intractable, but it is reasonable to suppose that  +1 is small relative to   .(put a footnote here) In this case an approximation,  , for the welfare-weighted mean is obtained as the ratio of two fractional moments:
( 1 7 ) Suppose further that   is lognormally distributed as
, with mean and variance of logarithms of   and  2  respectively. Using the properties of the lognormal moment generating function, it can be found that:
( 1 8 ) Higher  therefore reduces  relative to  , by giving a lower weight to higher incomes. Appendix A reports simulation analyses which show that this does indeed provide a good approximation when used with equation (14) .
It is now possible to discuss comparative static properties of the model. Examination of (14), using (18) to approximate    , shows that a higher tax rate is 7 For  = 1 this takes the form
log   . 8 The results clearly depend on the precise cardinalisation of individuals' utility functions. 9 The th moment about the origin is given by
¢ ; see Aitchison and Brown (1957, p. 8) .
associated with a greater proportion of expenditure being devoted to transfer payments, whereby  +1 , is increasing in  at a decreasing rate. An increase in the tax rate gives the government more income to spend on both types of expenditure, but the increase in pension expenditure is relatively higher than the increase in public goods expenditure. 10 Population and income growth have similar effects, as they appear in (14) only together in the form (1 + )(1 + ): they are perfect substitutes for each other. Increases in  and  increase the share of expenditure on pension and decreases the share of expenditure on public goods, and also their ratio. With income growth or population growth, tax revenues of the government are increased such that the government is able to spend more on both types of expenditure. However, the increase in the expenditure on pensions is higher than the expenditure on public goods.
An increase in the interest rate has a negative effect on the share of expenditure on pensions and on the ratio of pensions to public goods, but increases total expenditure on public goods. A higher interest rate leads to more private savings by individuals at a young age. This results in a higher public goods expenditure and a lower ratio of pension to public goods expenditure.
An increase in income inequality, as measured by  2 , reduces  , from (18), and thus increases the proportion of expenditure devoted to the pension. Hence more basic inequality implies a more redistributive expenditure policy. This result is consistent with models examining majority voting over the tax rate, with an unconditional transfer payment, in which a uniform result is that more basic inequality leads to the choice of a more redistributive tax and transfer structure;
for example, see Meltzer and Richard (1981) . Similarly, an increase in inequality aversion, , also reduces   and therefore rises the share of expenditure on redistribution.
The comparative static results with respect to the weight attached to public goods, , suggest that an increase in the preference for public goods unambiguously increases the share of expenditure on public goods, but decreases share of expenditure on pensions and the ratio of pension to public goods expenditure.
Analytic results relating to  were found to be equivocal, but the sensitivity analysis reported below demonstrates that  and  fall as  increases.
The comparative static properties shown the direction of changes, but do not show the sensitivity the optimal expenditure composition with respect to changes in parameters. The baseline value for all parameters,  , , , , ,  2 and , were set to the average of the sample reported in Table 4 . The baseline value for the weight attached to public goods is 1. The parameter variations considered are 10 and 20 per cent changes around the baseline values. Table 1 The results show that the share of expenditure on pensions, public goods and their ratio are quite sensitive to variations in the tax rate, the weight attached to public goods, inequality aversion, the variance of the distribution of income and the discount factor. They are less sensitive to changes in the interest rate and the growth rates of population and income. The present framework allows an implied value,, of inequality aversion to be obtained. Using the approximation for   in (18) above, is, after some
For the lognormal distribution, median income is   =   , so the ratio of median to mean income is given by log(    ) = − 2  2. Hence (19) can be seen to involve a ratio of two terms consisting of logarithms of income ratios, one containing the welfare weighted mean and the other involving the median income.
Starting from equation (13), it is possible to express for the relevant period in terms of the other variables and the expenditure share . However, a problem is raised by the difficulty of obtaining detailed comparable data on the composition of government expenditure for a wide range of countries. A major difficulty in the present context is that inadequate information about expenditure components is available. Ideally, separate details regarding pension expenditure are required, 13 but only aggregate expenditure on transfer payments can be obtained: the use of the aggregates effectively requires an assumption that the composition of transfers is similar across countries. 11 Hence the results presented here should be treated with much caution. The data used here are described in detail in Appendix B.
Information about  2 can be obtained from the reported values of the Gini coefficient, again using properties of the lognormal distribution (as described in Table 2 shows the implied values of inequality aversion, , for each country in the sample. For each value of  the countries are ranked in increasing order, that is from low implied inequality aversion to high implied aversion. Furthermore, the countries are divided into various groups. The Scandinavian countries includes Denmark, Finland, Norway. The group of Commonwealth countries includes the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
From the generally large values of implied aversion reported in Table 2 , it seems highly likely that the inability to measure a more restricted concept of transfer payments has imparted a significant upward bias. It is therefore perhaps more useful to concentrate on the relative orders of magnitude for different countries.
There is much consistency in the rankings as  is varied. The average implied inequality aversion for Scandinavian countries is consistently higher than that of The ratio of social contributions to GDP includes social security contributions by employees, employers, and self-employed individuals, and other contributions whose source cannot be determined. They also include actual or imputed contributions to social insurance schemes operated by governments. is considered and in others it is net income. 
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